Map of Pennsylvania.
On March 28, 1979, TMI 2 near Harrisburg, Pa., was operating at about 100 percent power when it automatically shut down after a pump that provided cooling water stopped operating. Pressure and temperature increased in the reactor, causing a pressure relief valve to open. The valve opened as designed, and water and steam began flowing out of the reactor to a tank in the basement of the reactor building.
As pressure returned to normal, the valve should have closed. But, unknown to the operators, the valve stuck open. It remained open for more than two hours, allowing water that covered and cooled the fuel core to escape from the reactor system. This caused the fuel to begin to overheat.
However, instrumentation in the TMI control room indicated to the operators that the relief valve was closed and that too much water was being injected into the reactor vessel. Consequently, operators did not replace the water that was lost as a result of the open relief valve.
As pressure continued to drop, more and more coolant turned to steam, causing excessive vibration in the main coolant pumps. The vibration prompted operators, who did not realize the reactor was experiencing a loss of coolant, to shut down the pumps.
The loss of pressure and water caused a large steam bubble to form in the top of the reactor vessel, further preventing the flow of cooling water through the core. Without coolant, core temperatures rose above the melting point of the fuel cladding and the uranium fuel.
About half of the fuel melted before coolant flow was restored. The colder cooling water also shattered some of the hot fuel rods. All of the fuel was damaged.
As a result of the TMI 2 accident, 700,000 gallons of radioactive cooling water ended up in the basement of the reactor building and in tanks in the auxiliary building, contaminating them.
In addition, a small amount of radioactive material was released into the atmosphere from the ventilation stack of an auxiliary building to relieve pressure inside the reactor building.
The TMI 2 accident caused no injuries, and at least a dozen epidemiological studies conducted since 1981 have found no discernible direct health effects to the population in the vicinity of the plant. (For details, see the appendix that follows this fact sheet.)
A federal appeals court in December 2003 dismissed the consolidated cases of 2,000 plaintiffs seeking damages against the plant’s former owners for health problems they alleged the accident caused. The court said the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence they had received a radiation dose large enough to cause possible health effects.
Decades of research and scientific studies have shown no negative health effects on the population surrounding the plant.
People who suffered financial losses as a result of the precautionary evacuation following the incident were promptly paid, demonstrating the effectiveness of the industry’s liability insurance protection under the Price-Anderson Act. In addition, businesses were compensated for loss of revenue, and the state and local community were compensated for the expenses incurred during the response to the threat.
After cleaning up the damaged TMI 2 reactor, GPU Nuclear placed the plant in monitored storage in December 1993. In December 1999, GPU sold TMI 1 to AmerGen Energy Co., a joint venture of Exelon and British Energy Co. British Energy subsequently sold its interest in TMI 1 to Exelon. In 2008, AmerGen Energy Co. was integrated into Exelon Generation, and the AmerGen legal entity was dissolved.
Under the terms of the sale, GPU retained ownership of TMI 2. GPU subsequently merged with FirstEnergy, making First Energy financially responsible for the decommissioning of TMI 2. In-plant and off-site monitoring of TMI 2 will continue until it is fully decommissioned, with regular reports made to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the public.
The two reactors will be decommissioned jointly when TMI 1 is taken out of service.
Actions to Improve Safety
Two weeks after the 1979 accident, President Jimmy Carter appointed a 12-member commission, headed by the late John Kemeny, then president of Dartmouth College, to investigate what had happened and the possible impact on the health and safety of the public and plant personnel.
The commission’s report on its investigation, issued in October 1979, recommended that the industry develop its own standards of excellence. The commission also cited a need for agency-accredited training institutions for nuclear plant operators and immediate supervisors of operations.
The NRC also moved quickly, setting up a group to study the accident. The group, headed by attorney Mitchell Rogovin, reached many of the same conclusions as the Kemeny Commission.
Within nine months of the accident, the industry had formed INPO, whose mission is to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability in the operation of nuclear power plants.
To improve training, INPO in 1985 formed the National Academy for Nuclear Training. The academy reviews and accredits nuclear utilities’ training programs for all key positions at each plant.
INPO has had a profound impact on the way nuclear plants are managed and operated. The proof is the steady improvement in plant performance in the nearly 30 years since the accident at TMI.
Today, the country’s 104 operating reactors maintain high levels of safety and reliability, as evidenced by the NRC’s reactor oversight program and performance indicators tracked by the World Association of Nuclear Operators.
Three Mile Island
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